Advance and Destroy: Patton as Commander in the Bulge (American Warrior Series)

5 Nov

Advance and Destroy: Patton as Commander in the Bulge (American Warrior Series)

Advance and Destroy: Patton as Commander in the Bulge (American Warrior Series)

Language: English

Pages: 528

ISBN: 0813134552

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

In the winter of 1944–1945, Hitler sought to divide Allied forces in the heavily forested Ardennes region of Luxembourg and Belgium. He deployed more than 400,000 troops in one of the last major German offensives of the war, which became known as the Battle of the Bulge, in a desperate attempt to regain the strategic initiative in the West. Hitler's effort failed for a variety of reasons, but many historians assert that Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr.'s Third Army was ultimately responsible for securing Allied victory. Although Patton has assumed a larger-than-life reputation for his leadership in the years since World War II, scholars have paid little attention to his generalship in the Ardennes following the relief of Bastogne.

In Advance and Destroy, Captain John Nelson Rickard explores the commander's operational performance during the entire Ardennes campaign, through his "estimate of the situation," the U.S. Army's doctrinal approach to problem-solving. Patton's day-by-day situational understanding of the Battle of the Bulge, as revealed through ULTRA intelligence and the influence of the other Allied generals on his decision-making, gives readers an in-depth, critical analysis of Patton's overall effectiveness, measured in terms of mission accomplishment, his ability to gain and hold ground, and a cost-benefit analysis of his operations relative to the lives of his soldiers. The work not only debunks myths about one of America's most controversial generals but provides new insights into his renowned military skill and colorful personality.















(working with First Army) XIX Tactical Air Command: Brigadier General Otto P. Weyland (working with Third Army) XXIX Tactical Air Command: Major General R. E. Nugent (working with Ninth Army) IX Bombardment Division: Brigadier General Samuel E. Anderson 2nd Tactical Air Force (working with British Second Army): Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham Š B. German Order of Battle, December 16, 1944 Oberbefelshaber West: Generalfeldmarschall Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt Chief of Staff:

misunderstood and that G-3 would straighten it out. 4th Inf Div G-3 stated that because of the time limit for plans to be submitted for the coming operation, the plans that they will submit will only be map studies. Gen Canine said that XII Corps could do the coordinating from these map studies and that they would be sufficient.舡 Telephone conversation, General Canine and G-3 4th Infantry Division, C/S Section 26 1345 Dec 44, XII Corps, RG 407, entry 427, NARA II. 37. Irwin Diary, December 26

Security 13, no. 4 (spring 1999): 54舑89. The British official historian, Brigadier General James E. Edmonds, traced the origin of the concept to the Franco-Prussian War. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1948), 386. For a discussion of required ratios in excess of 3:1, see Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904舑1945 (London: George Allen 8 Unwin, 1982), 284. 61. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, 舠Combat Data and

Wehrmacht at War, 1939舑1945: The Units and Commanders of the German Ground Forces during World War II. Soesterbeg, Netherlands: Aspekt, 1999. Lande, D. A. I Was with Patton: First Person Accounts of WWII in George S. Patton舗s Command. St. Paul, Minn.: Motor Books International, 2001. Lewin, Ronald. Ultra Goes to War. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. Liddell Hart, B. H. History of the Second World War. New York: Putnam, 1970. 舑舑舑舑舑舑. The Other Side of the Hill: Germany舗s Generals, Their Rise and

In 1940 the Wehrmacht had actually been outnumbered in divisions and tanks when it invaded France. By fielding a highly skilled combined arms and joint force with superior and aggressive leaders, the Germans disproved the notion that an attacker needs a significant margin of superiority to achieve success. They faced a similar scenario in late 1944. Heeresgruppe B was outnumbered in actual divisions, artillery, armor, and combat aircraft, but the U.S. Army was not the French army. By December

Download sample